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Abstract
For what should individuals be held responsible? This is a fundamental
question in much of the contemporary debate on distributive justice. Dif-
ferent fairness ideals, such as strict egalitarianism, and different versions of
equal opportunity ethics and libertarianism can be interpreted as giving dif-
ferent answers to this question. In order to study the prevalence of these
fairness ideals in society, we present the results from a dictator game where
the distribution phase is preceded by a production phase. Each player’s con-
tribution is a result of working time, productivity and price. We estimate
what factors the participants hold each other responsible for and the weight
they attach to fairness. In addition, we examine to what extent institutions
such as education and the labor market shape fairness preferences. We do
this by comparing the estimates for business students at different stages in
their education, and by comparing the estimates for final-year business stu-
dents with the estimates for former business students with some years of
work experience.
For what should individuals be held responsible? This is a core question both
in the modern political debate on distributive justice and in normative theoreti-
cal reasoning. In particular, there is substantial disagreement about the extent to
which people should be held responsible for various factors affecting their pre-tax
income. In the normative literature, there has been an increasing focus on equal
opportunity theories of distributive justice that combine an egalitarian commit-
ment with a concern for individual responsibility (Rawls, 1971; Dworkin, 1981;
Roemer, 1998). In the political debate, the controversy between left-wingers and
right-wingers may, to a large extent, be interpreted as disagreement over the role
individual responsibility should play in the design of redistributive policies. Typ-
ically, right-wingers argue that people should be held responsible for a large frac-
tion of the factors that determine their incomes, while left-wingers defend a more
limited role for individual responsibility.
Despite the importance of the normative question of what people should be
held responsible for, the positive question of what people actually hold each other
responsible for has received little attention in the experimental literature. Exper-
imental work has established, with games such as the ultimatum game and the
dictator game, that people are motivated by fairness considerations and that they
are willing to sacrifice pecuniary gains in order to avoid large deviations from
what they consider to be a fair outcome (Camerer, 2003). These games, how-
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ever, are not well suited for studying attitudes towards individual responsibility,
because none of the players contribute to the production of the money that is dis-
tributed. To address the question of what people hold each other responsible for
more broadly, it is necessary to study distributional preferences in more complex
situations involving production.
We study a dictator game where the distribution phase is preceded by a pro-
duction phase.1 In the production phase, the players were randomly assigned one
of two documents and asked to type the text on a computer. The value of their
production depended on the number of minutes they decided to work, the number
of correct words they typed per minute and a randomly assigned price for each
correctly typed word. The participants may therefore differ with respect to three
factors; time, productivity and price. In the experiment, work time was clearly a
factor within individual control and price was clearly a factor beyond individual
control. It is less clear, however, how to classify individual productivity. Most
likely, the participants considered it a factor shaped in a complex way by other
factors both within and beyond individual control. In this study, we are particu-
larly interested in how people deal with differences in productivity in distributive
situations. Much of the political debate on redistribution centers around the ques-
tion of whether individual productivity is within or beyond individual control, and
thus we believe it important to shed some light on the extent to which people find
it fair to hold others responsible for this factor.
Different normative theories have different implications for what factors we
should hold people responsible for in such situations. Two opposing views are
strict egalitarianism and libertarianism. Strict egalitarianism does not hold peo-
ple responsible for any of the factors determining production, while libertarianism
holds people responsible for all factors. Equal opportunity ethics can be seen as
an intermediate position, which holds people responsible for some, but not all,
factors. This position has been given different interpretations. Choice egalitari-
anism holds people responsible for factors within individual control but not for
factors beyond individual control.2 Meritocratism, on the other hand, holds in-
1The dictator game with a production phase is also studied in Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and
Tungodden (Forthcoming), Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002), Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and
Kurki (2004) and Konow (2000).
2In Cappelen et al. (Forthcoming), we show that in an experiment where all factors clearly
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dividuals responsible for a broad set of personal traits, independent of whether
these traits are a result of individual choices or not. Therefore, meritocrats hold
people responsible for individual productivity, while choice egalitarians only do
so if they consider individual productivity a factor within individual control. In
the experiment, we were not in a position to measure to what extent people believe
that individual productivity is within or beyond individual control. Consequently,
we cannot sharply distinguish between choice egalitarianism and meritocratism.
However, we can study the prevalence of people who hold others responsible only
for working time and people who hold others responsible for working time and
individual productivity, and for simplicity of exposition, we will refer to the first
group as choice egalitarians and the second as meritocrats. The share of individ-
uals who are either meritocrats or libertarians is thus an estimate of the share of
individuals who hold others responsible for their productivity.
People’s views on responsibility may partly be formed by the institutions they
have been exposed to, which may also explain the huge differences in fairness per-
ceptions that we find both within and between countries (Piketty, 1995; Alesina,
Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Alesina and Angele-
tos, 2005). The second main aim of this paper is to study the role of institutions
in shaping fairness preferences by looking at whether a particular education, in
our case business studies, and participation in the labor market make people more
or less ready to hold others responsible for the factors affecting their production.
There is a substantial literature arguing that both education and market integra-
tion have an effect on the importance people assign to self-interest considerations
(Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, and Gintis, 2004; Frank, Gilovich, and
Regan, 1996), but interestingly, these studies have not considered the possibility
that such institutions may also have an effect on what people consider fair. In-
tuitively, it seems plausible to claim that both business studies and participation
in the labor market make people more inclined to consider the market outcome
as fair, independently of any effect that such institutions may have on the impor-
tance people attach to self-interest considerations. We propose a framework that
makes it possible to study simultaneously both the effect institutions may have
could be identified as either within or beyond individual control, the most prevalent fairness ideal
was to hold individuals responsible only for the factors within individual control.
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on the role of self-interest and the effect institutions may have on people’s no-
tions of fairness. Based on a simple random utility model where people make a
trade-off between pecuniary gains and fairness considerations when proposing a
distribution of the total production, we estimate for each subject group the share
that find it fair to hold people responsible for a given set of factors and the impor-
tance people in this group attach to fairness considerations. We then look at the
possible effects of business education by comparing the estimates for first-year
business students with the estimates for second and final-year business students,
and the effect of participating in the labor market by comparing the estimates for
final-year business students with the estimates for business graduates with work
experience.
Section 1 describes the basic model in more detail, including a further dis-
cussion of the different fairness views on responsibility. Section 2 provides a
discussion of the experimental design, while the results and robustness tests are
reported in Section 3. Section 4 contains some concluding comments.
1 The model
Consider an economy in which the individuals differ in working time (q), produc-
tion per time unit (a) and the price (p) they receive per unit they produce, and
where individual i ’s production value (xi ) is the product of these three factors,
such that xi.ai ; qi ; pi/ D qiaipi . Working time is assumed to be completely
within individual control, while the price is assumed to be completely beyond
individual control. Individual productivity, on the other hand, is partly a result
of factors within individual control and partly a result of personal characteristics
beyond individual control.
Given this economic structure, we are concerned with distributional situa-
tions involving pairs of individuals, who are referred to as person 1 and person
2. The total production value to be distributed in any given distributional situation
is given by X.a; q;p/ D x1.a1; q1; p1/ C x2.a2; q2; p2/, where a D .a1; a2/,
q D .q1; q2/, and p D .p1; p2/. Each individual proposes an amount of income
y to herself and X   y to her opponent.
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1.1 Fairness and choice
We assume that individuals, when proposing an income distribution, are motivated
by income and a desire to act according to a fairness ideal, where individual i ’s
fairness ideal is denoted by mk.i/ and specifies a unique distribution of income
.mk.i/; X   mk.i// in any given distributional situation. We also assume that the
marginal disutility of deviating from the fairness ideal is strictly increasing in the
size of the deviation from the fair distribution. Specifically, we assume that person
i is maximizing the following utility function when proposing a distribution:
(1) Vi.yi I a; q;p/ D yi   ˇi
2
.yi  mk.i/.a; q;p//2
X.a; q;p/
;
where ˇi  0 is the weight an individual i assigns to fairness considerations. For
an interior solution, the optimal proposal, yi , is:
(2) yi D mk.i/.a; q;p/CX.a; q;p/=ˇi :
The optimal proposal thus depends on the fairness ideal endorsed by the individual
and the importance assigned to fairness considerations. Note that this specifica-
tion of the utility function implies that the proposed share yi =X is given by the
fair share mk.i/=X plus a constant determined by the weight attached to fairness
considerations. Alternative formulations of the utility function are considered in
Section 3.4.
1.2 Fairness and the responsibility cut
We assume that the individuals endorse one of the following fairness principles:
strict egalitarianism, one of two versions of equal opportunity ethics (choice egal-
itarianism or meritocratism) or libertarianism. The difference between these four
fairness principles lies in the implications they have for what is often referred
to as the responsibility cut, that is, for what factors individuals should be held
responsible and for what factors individuals should not be held responsible. In
formalizing the responsibility cut, it is useful to introduce the responsibility set
Rk  fa; p; qg. The responsibility set represents the factors for which people are
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held responsible under fairness ideal k.
According to strict egalitarianism, total income should be distributed equally
between the two individuals, independently of how it came about. Hence, the indi-
viduals are not held responsible for any of the factors affecting production, which
implies that the responsibility set is simply the empty set, RSE D ;. The strict
egalitarian view is closely related to the motivation captured in the inequality-
aversion models, which assume that people dislike unequal outcomes, indepen-
dently of the source of inequality (see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Frohlich et al.
(2004)).
Equal opportunity ethics objects to strict egalitarianism because it believes that
people should be held responsible for some of the factors affecting the outcome of
their actions (Roemer, 1998). There are different versions of this position, which
reflect different views on how to justify the responsibility cut. Choice egalitarians
argue that individuals should be held responsible for factors within their control
but not for factors beyond their control and thus view an inequality as fair if it
reflects differences in choices. In our experiment, the only factor that is clearly
within individual control is the choice of working time. We therefore refer to
choice egalitarianism as the view that the responsibility set is given byRCE D fqg
and that the fair distribution is to give each person a share of the total income equal
to his or her share of the total working time.
An alternative version of equal opportunity ethics, often called meritocratism,
is to argue that an individual should be held responsible for a broad set of personal
traits, including individual productivity, independently of whether these character-
istics are a result of individual choices or not (Arrow, Bowles, and Durlauf, 2000).
This implies that meritocrats only consider it fair to eliminate inequalities due to
factors that are unrelated to the individual merits, in other words, the responsibil-
ity set is given by RM D fq; ag. A fair distribution according to meritocratism
would be to give each person a share of the total income equal to his or her share
of the total production.
The libertarian fairness ideal is at the opposite extreme of strict egalitarianism
and implies that people are held responsible for all factors affecting their income.
It has been defended as the only way of respecting people’s self-ownership (Noz-
ick, 1974). The responsibility set is given byRL D fq; a; pg, and the fair distribu-
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tion is simply to give each person the value of what she produces. The libertarian
solution may thus involve an unequal distribution of income due to differences in
prices as well as in individual productivity and working time.
There are other logically possible ways of drawing the responsibility cut, fag,
fa; pg, fpg ; and fq; pg. However, there does not seem to be any reasonable justi-
fication for these approaches, and we ignore them in the following.
We can capture the four relevant fairness ideals in the following general fair-
ness function:
(3) mk.a; q;p/ D r1.R
k; a; q;p/
r1.Rk; a; q;p/C r2.Rk; a; q;p/X.a; q;p/;
where:
ri.R
k; a; q;p/ D
˚
1 if k D SE;
qi if k D CE;
aiqi if k DM;
aiqipi if k D L
:
As the general fairness function makes clear, the fairness ideals, except for strict
egalitarianism, distribute the total production proportionally to the product of the
values of the responsibility factors for each person. Given our specific interest in
how people deal with differences in productivity in distributive situations, it is im-
portant to note that we have two fairness ideals that do not hold people responsible
for productivity (strict egalitarianism and choice egalitarianism) and two fairness
ideals that do hold people responsible for this factor (meritocratism and libertari-
anism).
2 Experimental design
The experiment was a dictator game in which the distribution phase was preceded
by a production phase. The participants in the experiment were recruited from
first-, second- and fourth-year students at the Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration. In addition, we invited alumni with some years
of work experience (2–10 years). The participants were not informed about the
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purpose of the experiment but only invited to take part in a research project. They
were told that they would receive a participation fee of 100 NOK (approximately
15 USD) and that they might earn additional money in the experiment. They
were also asked whether they wanted to participate in a long or a short version of
the experiment, and they were told that their monetary gain might depend on the
length of the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were informed about the
rules of the game, and they were given a complete description of how the game
would proceed.3 Each participant was then randomly, with equal probability, as-
signed document A or document B. Both documents were reports from public
commissions in Norway. The average length of the words in each document was
approximately the same. In the production phase, the participants were asked to
type the text in their assigned document into a word processing file on their com-
puter, where correctly typed words were given the value of 1 NOK (approx. 0.16
USD) for document A and 0.5 NOK (approx. 0.08 USD) for document B. The
price for a correctly typed word was thus completely outside the control of the
participants. The participants were also informed that the two texts were equally
difficult to type and thus that the price differential did not reflect any difference in
the time it took to copy the two texts.
The length of the production phase depended on which version of the exper-
iment they chose to participate in. Those who participated in the short version
worked for 10 minutes, while those who participated in long versions of the ex-
periment worked for 30 minutes. The short and the long version of the experiment
took place in two different computer labs. Those who participated in the long ver-
sion were asked to meet up 20 minutes before those who participated in the short
version. Hence, the production phase ended at the same time for the two groups.
When the production phase ended, they submitted the text, and this was automat-
ically compared with the original document. In order to make it easier for the
participants to make calculations in the distribution phase, we rounded off the re-
ported production to the nearest 50. The value of each participant’s production
was therefore equal to the reported production multiplied by the value of each
correctly typed word.
3The complete instructions are available upon request.
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In the distribution phase, each participant was matched with a sequence of not
more than six other players, where no information was given about the outcome
of any distributional situations before all proposals were made. The participants
were matched with people who had the same working time and with people who
had a different working time. All communication was anonymous and conducted
through a web-based interface. For each match the participants were given infor-
mation about the working time, production, and production value of both players.
They were then asked to propose a distribution of the total production value for the
two players. The proposals had to be rounded off to the closest 25 NOK. When
they had made proposals for all the matches, they were given an overview of all
their proposals and asked to give a final confirmation. If they regretted some of
their proposals, they were allowed to start over again and make new proposals.
When everyone had confirmed their proposals, one proposal was randomly
selected to determine the actual outcome for this person. A participant’s total
earnings were then the sum assigned to this person in the selected proposal plus
the participation fee. At the end of the experiment, the participants were assigned
a code and asked to write this code together with their bank account number on
a claim form. This form was placed in an envelope addressed to the accounting
division of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration.
The procedure ensured that neither the participants nor the research team were in
a position to identify how much each participant earned in the experiment.
We had nine student sessions, each containing a short and a long version of
the experiment. Each student was only permitted to participate once. In total,
238 students participated: 82 first-year students, 84-second year students and 72
fourth-year students. We had one alumni session with 57 participants.
In the production phase of the experiment, there were four possible combina-
tions of working time and price. As shown in Table 1, the average productivity of
the individuals for each of these combinations was approximately the same. There
is thus no evidence that prices had an important effect on effort in the experiment.
[Table 1 about here.]
In the distribution phase, the paired players might differ with respect to the
working time, their production per minute and the price they received per correctly
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typed word. In general, the fairness principles justify different fair distributions,
but they coincide in certain distributional situations. Figure 1 shows that we had
only a small number of distributional situations where the players were identical
with respect to production per minute.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Given unequal productivity, we can distinguish between four different cate-
gories of distributional situations; the two players could differ with respect to the
time they worked and the price they received. The various fairness principles
would still coincide in some of the distributional situations. First, if the players
were identical with respect to both the working time and the price they received,
then the strict egalitarian and the choice egalitarian ideals would imply the same
fair distribution, as would the meritocratic and the libertarian positions. Second,
if the players differed in working time but were given the same price for their
production, the meritocratic and the libertarian positions would stipulate the same
fair distribution. Third, if the players had the same working time but were as-
signed different prices, then the choice egalitarian and strict egalitarian fairness
ideal would coincide. If the players differed along all dimensions, then none of
the fairness ideals would coincide perfectly.
To obtain a better picture of the potential variation in offers implied by the
different fairness ideals, Figure 2 shows how the various fairness ideals correlate
in all the distributional situations in the experiment. The size of the dots in the
scatter plot indicates the number of distributional situations covered by this point.
If two fairness ideals were to coincide in all the distributional situations, then all
the points should be at the diagonal in the respective comparison. In general, there
is substantial variation between the fairness ideals, and thus potentially, they could
all contribute in the empirical analysis.
[Figure 2 about here.]
3 Results
As a background for the analysis, we present some descriptive statistics. We then
formulate a random utility model and estimate how our subjects actually draw the
11
responsibility cut and the weight they attach to fairness considerations.
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents some key information about individual offers. The average of-
fer to the opponent was 38.5% (which amounted to 286 NOK; approximately 48
USD). This is substantially higher than is commonly observed in standard dictator
games without production (Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Camerer, 2003) and may
indicate that the presence of a production phase caused people to care more about
fairness considerations. We also observe that the second-year students offered a
significantly lower share than the other subject groups and that the alumni offered
a significantly higher share than the other subject groups. Note, however, that the
size of the average offer does not provide us with any information about the preva-
lence of the different fairness principles. The fair average offer is the same for all
the four fairness ideals, namely X=2. This is easily seen by observing that, for
any particular distributional situation and for any fairness ideal k, the fair solution
would be that person 1 offers X  mk to person 2 and that person 2 offers mk to
person 1. Hence, it is not the case that a high average offer indicates, for example,
a large share of strict egalitarians and a small share of libertarians.
This point can be illustrated further by looking at a distributional situation
where we observed a very high offer to the opponent of 95% of the total income.
In this case, player 1 had worked for 10 minutes, produced 100 words and received
a price of 0.5 NOK. Player 2, on the other hand, had worked for 30 minutes,
produced 850 words and received a price of 1 NOK. Hence, they had 900 NOK
to split. Given this information, player 1 acted in accordance with the libertarian
fairness ideal and offered player 2 almost all of the total income, 850 NOK.
Interestingly, in 29.5% of the offers, the player proposed more to the opponent
than to him- or herself. In 9.3% of the offers, the player proposed everything to
him- or herself. As we can see from Table 2, there were substantial differences
among the subject groups in the number of offers where the player proposed ev-
erything to him- and herself. Such offers were quite rare among first-year students
and alumni, while about 15% of the offers from second and fourth-year students
left nothing to the opponent.
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[Table 2 about here.]
3.2 Empirical model
We adapt the choice model to bring it into line with the fact that we asked the
participants to round off their proposals to the nearest 25 NOK. The choice of y
is therefore restricted to the set Y.a; q;p/ D f0; 25; 50; : : : ; X.a; q;p/g, and we
introduce random variation that is idiosyncratic to each choice:
(4) Ui.yI / D Vi.yI /C "iy=:
The constant  determines the weight given to the random elements "iy , which we
assume are i.i.d. extreme value distributed. The individuals choose y such that
Ui.y
I /  Ui.yI / for all y in Y.a; q;p/.
This model has a mixed logit structure where each person is characterized by
his or her fairness ideal, k, as well as the parameter ˇi . We cannot classify in-
dividuals by .k; ˇ/, but we estimate the distribution of these characteristics. The
distribution of fairness ideals is discrete, and we approximate the distribution of
ˇ by a log-normal distribution, such that logˇ  N.; 2/. Because the fairness
ideal and the importance a person assigns to fairness considerations are unob-
served, these must be integrated out for the unconditional choice probabilities as
functions of the observed variables. If we introduce a subscript j D 1; : : : ; Ji
indexing the situations an individual i faces, and let k denote the share of the
subject group that hold the fairness ideal k, the likelihood of an individual i mak-
ing proposals .yi1; : : : ; yiJi / from the sets of feasible proposals .Yi1; : : : ;YiJi /
given a parameter vector  D .SE ; CE ; M ; L; ; ; /, is:
(5) Li./ D
X
k
k
Z 1
0
0@ JiY
jD1
eV.yij Iaij ;qij ;pij ;k;ˇ/P
s2Yij e
V.sIaij ;qij ;pij ;k;ˇ/
1A dF.ˇI ; /:
Repeated observations and the fact that we expose individuals to different dis-
tributional situations provide information about the distribution of fairness ideals
and the weight people attach to them. Given that the distributional situations are
symmetrical and all fairness ideals specify that an equal split is fair on average,
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the average offer identifies the weight people attach to fairness on average. On the
basis of how intra individual and inter individual variance in offers relate to ob-
servable characteristics of the distributional situation, we estimate the distribution
of ˇ and the population shares.
3.3 Structural estimates
Table 3 reports the estimates of the structural model for each of the four subject
groups, where the estimate for each of the fairness ideals is the proportion of the
participants motivated by this particular fairness ideal.4
[Table 3 about here.]
Consider first our estimates for the first-year students. The estimated share
of strict egalitarians is 23.5%, the share of choice egalitarians is 6.6%, the share
of meritocrats is 41.5% and the share of libertarians is 28.4%. There is, in other
words, considerable pluralism in where these students draw the responsibility cut.
However, at the same time, the analysis reveals overlapping consensus on a num-
ber of issues. First, almost 80% of these first-year students (choice egalitarians,
meritocrats and libertarians) find it fair to hold people responsible for their work-
ing time, that is, for a factor that was fully within individual control. Second, more
than 70% (strict egalitarians, choice egalitarians and meritocrats) do not find it fair
to hold people responsible for the price, which was completely beyond individ-
ual control. Finally, 70% of the first-year students (meritocrats and libertarians)
consider it fair to hold people responsible for their productivity.
We find it particularly interesting to observe that most participants hold others
responsible for their productivity, but not for the price assigned to them. This
observation challenges the common view that the responsibility cut only relies on
a distinction between factors within and factors beyond individual control. If both
productivity and price are seen as factors beyond individual control, then we need
a further explanation of why people hold others responsible for one and not the
other. We suggest that the explanation might be that people assign importance to
4Note that the restriction that a common model applies to all groups can be rejected with
p < 0:001 using a standard likelihood ratio test.
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the distinction between personal and impersonal factors, and are willing to hold
others responsible for personal factors even if they are beyond individual control.
Alternatively, one may argue that productivity is viewed by the participants as
fully within individual control and thus that our estimates show a strong support
for choice egalitarianism.
How is the prevalence of different fairness ideals affected by business studies?
If we compare columns (1) and (2) in Table 3, there is a striking similarity in the
population share estimates. The estimated shares for the second-year students are
almost identical to those of the first-year students. Furthermore, there is hardly any
difference in the share of strict egalitarians and the share of choice egalitarians in a
comparison of the different student groups. However, in a comparison of first-year
and fourth-year students, we see that the share of libertarians falls from 28.4% to
15.0%, and the share of meritocrats increases from 41.5% to 57.8%. This result
is surprising because it suggests that business studies do not have the effect that
one might expect, namely that more students during their studies come to view
the libertarian solution as fair.
In order to study the effect of participation in the labor market, we compare
the fourth-year students with the alumni group. As we observe from comparing
(3) and (4), there are large and systematic differences in the prevalence of the four
fairness ideals among these two groups. In particular, the prevalence of libertar-
ians triples from 15.0% to 44.8%. This suggests that deeper involvement in the
labor market makes this group more likely to accept inequalities due to differences
in prices.
It is also interesting to study how business studies and labor market experience
affect the weight people attach to fairness considerations. To understand the effect
of the estimated values of ;  and  , we provide Figure 3. This figure takes as
the point of departure a situation where the total produced value is 1000 and the
fairness ideal endorsed by a hypothetical individual specifies an equal split. We
then provide for each of the four subject groups, and for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th
and 90th percentiles of the distribution of ˇ, the deterministic utility and, plotted
as solid bars, the implied choice probabilities for all multiples of 25 NOK for this
hypothetical individual.
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[Figure 3 about here.]
The general impression from Figure 3 is that business studies do not have
much impact on the weight people attach to fairness considerations except for at
the 10th percentile. We observe that the expected offer of a hypothetical individ-
ual at the 10th percentile of the estimated ˇ distribution is much higher for the
first-year students than for the second- and fourth-year students, which is in line
with the finding in Table 2 that the share of individuals offering nothing increases
significantly after the first year. At the other percentiles, however, the differences
are rather minor.
Interestingly, labor market experience appears to have a positive impact on the
weight attached to fairness considerations. At all percentiles, the expected offer
is higher for the alumni than for the fourth-year students, and roughly in line with
what we observe among the first-year students. We should be careful, however,
about how to interpret this result because the average income among the alumni
is much higher than for the fourth-year students.
To see how well our estimates predict the actual distribution of offers, we
simulate distributions of offers for the distributional situations of each of the four
groups in the experiment. As we can see from Figure 4, the fit is good.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3.4 Robustness tests
Our estimates rely on assumptions about the distribution of ˇ and functional form
of the utility function. In order to assess how sensitive our estimates are to our
particular specifications, we provide specification tests in Table 4.5
[Table 4 about here.]
In specification R1 (in Table 4), we examine whether our assumption of a log-
normal distribution of ˇ is crucial to our results. We do so by adding a mass 0 at
the point ˇ D 0, such that ˇ is now distributed as a mixture of 0 with probability
5We do not report new estimates for  , ,  , since they are in line with what is reported in
Table 3.
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0 and a log-normal variate with probability 1   0. We see that this probability,
estimated to be in the range 0:049   0:170, is well above zero. However, the
increase in the log-likelihood is not dramatic, and the estimated population shares
hardly change at all. From this we conclude that the assumption of log-normality
is not crucial to our results.
In specifications R2 and R3, we consider alternative functional forms of the
utility function. In R2, we let the utility loss from a choice of y depend on the ab-
solute value of the deviation from the fairness ideal, regardless of the total income
produced. We see that this specification does uniformly worse than our preferred
estimates in terms of likelihood values. In R3, we let the utility loss depend on
the size of the deviation relative to the size of the total income produced. We
see that this specification does slightly worse in terms of likelihood in the speci-
fication where parameters vary by subject group,  2719:3 versus  2716:0 in our
preferred specification. However, for two subject groups (the first- and fourth-
year students), the log-likelihood is slightly higher in R3 than in our preferred
specification. Because the quantitative changes in estimated population shares
are not very large, we do not consider the choice between R3 and our preferred
specification crucial to our results.
4 Concluding remarks
The notion of responsibility plays an important role in political debate and has
been the focus of much work in modern normative theory. Nonetheless, the posi-
tive question of what people actually hold each other responsible for has received
little attention. The aim of the present study has been to conduct an experiment
that allows us to examine this question in more detail.
Our analysis shows that there is a large majority of students that do not hold
people responsible for the price they were assigned, an impersonal factor beyond
individual control. The support for this view was significantly lower among for-
mer students with some years of work experience. However, even within this
group, a majority of the participants did not hold people responsible for the price.
There seems also to be broad support for the view that individuals should be
held responsible for factors under their control. More than 75% of the participants
17
in all the four subject groups reject a strict egalitarian position. This conclusion is
also illustrated by the fact that in 29.5% of the offers in the experiment, the player
proposed more to the opponent than to him- or herself.
A main finding in this paper is that the majority of both students and alumni
hold others responsible for their productivity. We believe that the more plausible
interpretation of this result is that the majority of our participants are ready to
hold individuals responsible for personal traits even if they are outside individual
control. At the same time, a large majority of this group are not willing to hold
people responsible for another factor outside individual control, namely price.
This suggests that for many of our participants, the core distinction when draw-
ing the responsibility cut is not between choices and circumstances but between
impersonal and personal factors. This finding is particularly interesting given the
prominence of the choice egalitarian view in normative theoretical reasoning, and
questions whether this view really plays a prominent role in the political debate.
Note, however, that this is not to say that choices are unimportant in the respon-
sibility debate. The meritocratic position also justifies holding people responsible
for their choices, but the justification is not that choices are under individual con-
trol, rather that they are personal characteristics that merit reward.
The second main finding in this paper is that institutions such as education
and the labor market appear to shape people’s fairness preferences in a way that is
not much discussed in the experimental literature. The focus has been on whether
institutions make people more or less self-interested, but the equally interesting
question is whether institutions affect people’s notion of fairness. Our results
show that experience with the labor market seems to increase the likelihood that
people view the market outcome as fair. Equally interesting, we do not find this
pattern in our study of business education. One might think that the strong focus
on the efficiency of markets in the teaching of business and economics should
make people more inclined to think that people should receive the value of their
production, but this is not the case in our group of business students. On the
contrary, we see a move away from libertarianism towards meritocratism.
Our study supports earlier studies that find little evidence that business educa-
tion makes people more self-interested (Frey and Meier, 2005). On average, there
is only a slight decrease in the estimated weight that people assign to fairness.
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The main effect seems to be that there is an increase in the number of participants
that offer the opponent nothing among the second-year and fourth-year students.
Interestingly, however, the group of people that offer the opponent nothing almost
disappears among the alumni, who also on average seem to assign more weight to
fairness considerations than students.
Our results show that there is substantial heterogeneity in people’s notion of
fairness and the weight they attach to fairness considerations, and we believe that
an important task for future research should be to seek further understanding of
the explanations for these differences. We have made one attempt in this direction,
by studying the extent to which important institutions such as education and the
labor market appear to shape individual fairness preferences. Interestingly, the
main effect of these institutions seems to be that they change people’s notion of
fairness, while there are only moderate effects on the weight people attach to
fairness considerations.
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Figure 1: Distribution of productivity. The figure plots the productivity of player
1 and player 2 against each other for all distributional situations. The size of the
markers indicates the number of situations at that point.
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Figure 2: Scatter plots of fairness ideals. Pair-wise plots of mk.a; q;p/ against
mj .a; q;p/ for all the distributional situations in our data. The weight of dots
indicates the number of observations at that point.
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Figure 3: Illustration of implied choice probabilities. The graphs plot
V.yI / D .y   ˇ.y   m/2=2X/, for a hypothetical individual with m D 0:5
(marked by a vertical line). Calculated at the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th per-
centiles of the estimated ˇ distribution using the estimates in Table 3. Money, y,
is measured in thousands of NOK.
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Figure 4: Empirical distribution function of offers. Distributions of offers made
(as share of total production) and predictions from the estimated model for each
experimental group. The black line is our experimental data while the gray line
is predictions made from the estimates in Table 3. Predictions are made at the
distributional situations in our dataset.
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duration in minutes
price/word (NOK) 10 30 total
0.5 25.72 25.22 25.43
n D 62 n D 85 n D 147
1.0 23.28 21.33 22.17
n D 64 n D 84 n D 148
total 24.48 23.28 23.80
n D 126 n D 169 n D 295
Table 1: Statistics on productivity. The cells show average productivity and the
number of observations in each of the four categories.
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Share, .X   y/=X
1st year 2nd year 4th year alumni total
mean 0.396 0.338 0.383 0.430 0.385
standard deviation 0.188 0.233 0.223 0.172 0.208
minimum 0 0 0 0 0
maximum 0.789 0.944 0.862 0.973 0.973
Amount, X   y, in NOK
1st year 2nd year 4th year alumni total
mean 274 253 266 361 286
standard deviation 189 223 199 203 207
maximum 1000 1000 850 900 1000
share offering nothing 0.043 0.135 0.156 0.040 0.093
share offering more than half 0.296 0.270 0.299 0.319 0.295
Table 2: Descriptive statistics. Some key features of offers made to opponent.
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Subject group
parameter 1st year 2nd year 4th year alumni total
SE , share strict egalitarian 0.235 0.211 0.213 0.121 0.180
(0.065) (0.061) (0.062) (0.060) (0.030)
CE , share choice egalitarian 0.066 0.078 0.059 0.023 0.046
(0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.023) (0.019)
M , share meritocratic 0.415 0.421 0.578 0.408 0.470
(0.078) (0.080) (0.088) (0.084) (0.042)
L, share libertarian 0.284 0.289 0.150 0.448 0.305
(0.076) (0.073) (0.066) (0.088) (0.039)
, mean of logˇ 3.675 2.351 2.819 4.912 3.153
(0.319) (0.261) (0.332) (0.459) (0.162)
 , standard deviation of logˇ 2.293 2.502 2.618 3.073 2.672
(0.298) (0.297) (0.306) (0.445) (0.168)
 , inverse weight on " 9.669 21.358 15.058 4.512 12.432
(1.547) (1.987) (1.253) (0.785) (0.618)
Log likelihood of subject group  777:12  728:65  641:61  568:65
Total log likelihood  2716:03  2754:90
Table 3: Estimates of structural model. Standard errors, calculated using the
outer product of the gradient (Berndt et al., 1974), in parentheses. The model
is estimated with Simulated Maximum Likelihood (with 250 antithetic random
draws) using the FmOpt library (Ferrall, 2005).
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Subject group
1st year 2nd year 4th year alumni total
R1: probability mass, 0, at ˇ D 0.
SE 0.248 0.210 0.228 0.128 0.186
CE 0.071 0.077 0.059 0.023 0.045
M 0.411 0.424 0.576 0.404 0.471
L 0.270 0.289 0.137 0.445 0.287
0 0.111 0.130 0.170 0.049 0.120
logL/subject group  774:56  726:50  634:86  567:66
logL/total  2703:58  2744:55
R2: utility loss in absolute terms: V.yI / D y   ˇ.y  m/2=2.
SE 0.297 0.219 0.256 0.140 0.217
CE 0.078 0.083 0.078 0.025 0.054
M 0.396 0.475 0.562 0.402 0.470
L 0.229 0.223 0.104 0.434 0.260
logL/subject group  786:41  739:82  651:51  567:30
logL/total  2745:05  2784:42
R3: utility loss in relative terms: V.yI / D y   ˇ..y  m/=X/2=2.
SE 0.180 0.196 0.183 0.110 0.156
CE 0.052 0.053 0.041 0.022 0.038
M 0.403 0.498 0.538 0.410 0.451
L 0.366 0.342 0.238 0.458 0.355
logL/subject group  774:04  736:07  637:97  571:23
logL/total  2719:30  2751:98
Table 4: Tests of robustness. The population shares under three alternative spec-
ifications of the empirical model.
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